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A Totalitarianism that is Slow to Wither:
The Program of the Communist Party ·in Two Years' Perspective
G. THEODORE MITAU*
James Wallace Professor of Political Science, Macalester College
Despite Khrushchev's stress on "peaceful coexistence,"
on greater attention to consumer needs, and on certain
"democratizing" reforms in the party apparatus and legal
system of the state - concepts that had found their institutional expression in the program of the Party at the
22nd Congress - significant totalitarian elements in
Soviet ideology and in the power monopoly of the party
remained basically unchanged. That these elements cannot be ignored in any realistic appraisal of Soviet developments and intentions was again dramatically underscored by the manner of Khrushchev's removal in October of 1964.
Ideology and program perform a central role in Soviet totalitarianism . Together they represent the authoritative Communist promulgation of what is socially right
and wrong, of what is desirable and what is not. Through
them, Soviet society achieves its sense of unity and
strength, and receives from them the raison d'etre for
personal sacrifice and social discipline. Imposed by the
ruling elite, which can and does manipulate all the media
of communications, ideology thus serves to compel consensus and obedience to what is deemed fundamental for
the continuity and eventual victory of the Marxist-Leninist Weltanschauung.
Under Khrushchev, ideology had the "important effect
of transforming the party's power into authority, and of
replacing terror as a major buttress for the party's power." In this framework, it was the function of the Program, as the embodimen~ of the "holy writ," to provide
the party with the central guidelines for policy and action. Since the Soviet Union is a single-party totalitarian
state, the Program thus was depended on to set the
ideological course for all aspects of the collectivized life.
For an understanding of political realities in a party
state that knows no constitutional restraints, tolerates no
self-conscious pluralistic groups possessed of countervailing political power, rejects concepts of private rights
when asserted against the collectivity, has vowed to destroy all independent bureaucracies, civilian or military,
it is indispensable to analyze the program of such a party
for what it contains and avoids as well as for what it
favors and opposes.

* A graduate of Macalester and of the University of Minnesota (Ph.D., 1948) Professor Mitau took post-doctoral work at
both Harvard and Stanford Universities. Among his publications
are included articles in various legal and professional journals,
three books (including Politics in Minnesota) and contributions
to case books in the field of American Government. He has
taught at the Universities of Nebraska and Minnesota, and at
Macalester intermittently since 1940 where he is now, also,
chairman of the Department of Political Science .
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I. Preliminaries

When the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union convened in October of 196 I to adopt
the new party program - the first since 1919 - Khrushchev had, in fact, already solidly established his leadership in party and state. The struggle for the succession
to Stalin had come to an end.
Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, along
with Saburov and Pervukhin, were branded "anti-party"
and removed from the presidium during the summer of
1957. Although they and their associates were able to
out-vote Khrushchev at the critical June plenum of the
presidium, Khrushchev, as chairman of the party's presidium, refused to abide by their decision and took his
cause to the larger body, the central committee, which
sustained him and overrode the presidium. Zhukov, the
popular hero of the "patriotic war" who had helped
Khrushchev during this crisis, was subsequently charged
with "Bonapartist" leanings and, during October 1957,
was removed from the inner circle by resolution. Bulganin, who had succeeded Malenkov as chairman of the
council of ministers and with whom Khrushchev was
forced to share the spotlight during his travels throughout Asia and Eastern Europe, was expelled in 1958 for
having given support to the anti-party group. Voroshilov,
Stalin's one-time favorite, was purged in 1960.
With the exception of Beria, the brutal and uniformly
detested head of the secret police who was summarily
executed in 1953, Khrushchev's path to power, compared
to that of Stalin's, was relatively bloodless. Molotov became an ambassador to Outer Mongolia, Malenkov was
given a minor administrative managerial post with an
electric power station in Kazakhstan, Shepilov returned
to teaching, Kaganovich was assigned to head up a cement plant in the Urals, and Bulganin became chairman
of the Stavropol Economic Council.
Despite powerful domestic forces bent on revenge,
Khrushchev was able to bring back under control some of
the more immediate consequences and repercussions that
had been set into motion by the dramatic revelations of
Stalinist crimes documented in his famous report to the
20th Congress ( 1956). While ruthlessly suppressing uprisings in Hungary and Poland, at home Khrushchev appeared to stress norms of "legality" and needed revisions
of the criminal code. He promised increased availability
of consumers' goods, a better quality of products, improved housing construction, more food, and higher
levels of education; agricultural efficiency would be
raised and virgin lands to the east brought under cultivation.
Khrushchev traveled widely, preached "peaceful coexThe Minnesota Academy of Science

istence,"' and promised an easier life to all who lived
within the communist orbiL Visitors to the Soviet Union
reported a general sense of relaxation and a popular
mood of cautious optimism, Successes in the technology
of outer space and in the missiles race enormously excited the Soviet people and greatly enhanced Soviet
scientific prestige throughout the world,
Communist party unity seemed strengthened with the
"rehabilitation" of Tito and the Sino-Soviet compromises
at the "wodd" congresses of 1957 and 1960, Although the
"Spirit of Camp David" lasted only until the shadow of
the U-2 incident fell across it, Khrushchev's visit to the
United States and to the U,R, despite his displays of
diplomatic crudity, added substantially to his stature as
a spokesman for world communism,
Thus, having consolidated his position at home and,
at least, temporarily stabilized the "cold war" with the
U,S, and other Western powers over the outstanding issues of Berlin, disarmament, Laos, U,N, structure,
Congo, and nuclear testing, Khrushchev was now ready to
tackle one of the most difficult tasks for any totalitarian
leader: he had to become the party's chief ideologist and
bring Lenin up to date, The Program of the 22nd Congress was designed to serve as a vehicle to institutionalize
his concept of Leninist communism and to delineate the
frame of reference for future policy decisions by the loyal
cadres that he had placed in key positions in the party
and state administrations,
II. The Program

Structurally, the Program centered around two main
topics: 1 Part One, Transitions from Capitalism to Communism is the Road of Human Progress and Part Two,
The Tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
Building a Communist Society,
The first part of the Program begins with a rather traditional recital of Marxist-Leninist history stressing the
shortcomings of capitalism - the inherent contradictions
between workers and capitalists, the resulting production
anarchy, the periodic crises due to the falling purchasing
power of workers, the decreasing rate of economic
growth - all are considered signals that the "world capitalist system as a whole is ready for social revolution of
the proletariat,''
The "desperate" state of capitalism is then contrasted
with the "achievements" of the Soviet Union, Here the
party of Lenin industrialized the state, ended the exploitation of the working classes, raised the cultural level of
the proletariat and established a socialist state in which
"each contributed according to his ability and received
according to his work" (Marx said, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need!') It
established a society of " broad democracy" in which all
the people participate thorugh the Soviets, trade unions
and other mass organizations in the management of the
affairs of state and the economic and cultural advances
of society,
Soviet democracy is then pictured as going beyond
freedom of speech, press and assembly, the right to elect
and be elected, to include social rights as well - the right
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to work, rest, leisure, free education, free medical services, and material security in old age in case of illness
and disability, (This rather idyllic statement of communist "freedom" must, of course, be balanced and read
in the well known context of communist thought that
there cannot and should not be freedom for the enemies
of the "left" and "right," for "dogmatists," "sectarians,"
"factionaiists" and "revisionists" - euphemisms all for
those who take effective issue with the pronouncements
of the central committee and "its leading cadres!')
In the international realm , the Program sees the capitalist regimes rent by discord and fierce struggles which
are accentuated by the growing economic crisis for which
capitalism has no solution, The "fraternal socialist" world
system, on the other hand, "proceeds on the basis of
sovereignty and free will and in conformity with the fundamental interests of the working people!' 2 (The framers of this statement did not anticipate, however, that
Chou En-Lai would walk out of the 22nd Congress and
depart for Peking after Khrushchev's public insistence
that Hoxha and his Albanian labor party had removed
themselves from the "fraternal system" by failing to carry
out the agreements of the "peace" Congress of 1960),
"Peaceful coexistence" was characterized as the "chief
aim of Soviet foreign policy," 3 Such a policy would assure "peaceful conditions" for the building of a communist society in the U.S .S,R. and expand and protect the
world socialist system. Also, if pursued "together with
other peace-loving peoples" it might "deliver mankind
from a world war of extermination." Coupled with this
olive branch is the reassertion that imperialism is the only
source of war, that in the socialist camp there are no
groups interested in starting a war, and that the socialist
system is the "natural center" of attracting "the peaceloving forces of the world."
The Program does not rule out the " legitimacy" of certain types of wars. Specifically acknowledged are wars of
"assistance" and "liberation," especially the Cuban variety, "Together with other Marxist Leninist parties, the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards it as its
internationalist duty . . . ( to draw) . . . on the might
of the world socialist system" in order to "forestall or
firmly repel imperialist interference in the affairs of the
people of any country risen in revolt and thereby prevent
imperialist export of counter-revolution . . . " 1
Force can also become necessary according to the Program, "where the exploiting classes resort to violence
against the people." Under those conditions " the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be
borne in mind."
Further tactical flexibility is attained by the assertion
that "in each particular country the actual applicability
of one method of transition to socialism or the other
depends on concrete historical conditions."" Thus, while
opposing all "wars of conquest" the Soviet leadership
sees nothing in the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence"
that would necessarily preclude it from countering those
who were "strangling people's emancipation movements."
As a matter of fact, the Program stresses that it is the
"duty" of communists " to support the sacred struggle
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of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist
wars of liberation."
Stripped of its semantic camouflage, "peaceful1coexistence" provides ideological underpinnings sufficiently elastic for either peace or war. Whether it will be one or the
other would seem to depend in the future, as it did in
the past, more on the political-scientific-military realities
of the world balance of power than on the imperatives of
this vaguely phrased party directive. There is little in this
section of the Program to justify the turning off of lights
in the State Department, Pentagon, or in the C.1.A.
The Tasks of the Party . T his part of the Program is
the blueprint for the creating of the new Soviet communist man and society. Its outline is far from new. Envisaged is a classless social system in which all the means
of production are socially owned, all persons have "full
social equality," and the people's "all around development" is " accompanied by the growth of productive
forces through progress in science and technology." Each
person contributes according to his ability and receives
according to his needs. Public self government takes the
place of the state. Labor for the good of society replaces
the individual's acquisitive capitalistic drives.
The practical and nearly instantaneous establishment
of the material basis for these goals constitutes the major
burden of this section of the Program. Production targets
are ringing with eschatological fervor. Within a decade
the Soviet Union will "surpass" the United States in per
capita production. By 1980 the "abundance of material
and cultural values" will be insured . "Everyone will live
in easy circumstances; at! collective and state farms will
become highly productive and profitable enterprises; the
demand of the Soviet people for well-appointed housing
will, in the main be satisfied; hard physical work will disappear; the U.S.S.R. will have the shortest working
day."· Soviet citizens will be able to enjoy free of costs
their housing, basic utilities, transportation, medical care,
education, and a "catered midday meal" at public enterprises and institutions. Disparities "between high and
comparatively low incomes" will also be further reduced.
An upward revision of projected increases in heavy
industry, housing, consumers goods, food, medical services, educational benefits, recreational facilities, and cultural opportunities concludes with the party's promise
"that the present generation of Soviet people shall live in
communism." 8
Beyond this meld of concrete achievement and impassioned propaganda there emerge at least four important
policy emphases in the Program that deserve further attention.
First, "the peasants' school of communism," the kolkhoze, will, in its future development, take on more of the
character of state-owned farms so that the rural populations can be more easily "amalgamated" into urban
populations and help to eliminate "the socio-economic
and cultural distinctions between town and country." In
this way "kolkhoze property and the property of the
whole people" can be more easily fused into "one communist property." But, more succinctly, the peasant's private plot is on the way out. Supplementary individual
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farming will gradually become economically unnecessary.
Peasants will give it up "on their own accord. ""
Second, deficiencies in planning and efficiency must be
overcome. The Program decrees that centralized planning
is to afford greater initiative and independence to local
enterprises; losses must be reduced, thrift practiced, production costs cut and the profitability of enterprises enhanced.10
Third, to the party, rather than to the state, are assigned the major responsibility for organizing, directing
and controlling the road to communism. 11 ·'Organized
state power" is to be gradually transformed into "organs
of public self government." A vigilant party, assisted by
the Young Communist League and the trade unions, will
assure " the education of the people in the 'broadest democracy' which must go hand in hand with strict observance of comradely discipline." 12 Jn the communist
state described by the Program, "rights" and "duties" are
fused in order "to form a single standard of communist
behavior" 13 and "comradely censure of anti-social behavior will gradually become the principal means of doing away with manifestations of bourgeois views, customs, and habits." 14
The primacy of the party is explained in terms of its
unique qualification to meet the "growing scope and complexity of the tasks of communist construction," to accommodate the demands for wider participation of the
people in the administrative affairs of state and production, and to assure the greatest possible doctrinal unity
and direction.
To make the party more attractive and more "democratic" the Program (as well as the rules for party government adopted separately by the 22nd Congress) calls
for more rapid turn over of party committee membership, maximum terms of office for key committees ( not
more than three successive terms), more active participation of the membership in all phases of party and state
work, reduced employment of paid staffs and review of
expulsions by higher party echelons. These "'democratizing" features of party reform are then balanced by the
directive that (I) some members with outstanding organizational talent and competence may be asked to serve
for longer terms and (2) the party must strengthen its
vigilance against all "manifestations of factionalism and
group activity incompatible with Marxist-Leninist party
principles." "'
Ill. The Program at Work

With this brief sketch of the main "planks" of the
Program in mind, it should prove interesting to explore
a few of the major ideological stresses and strains to
which the program has been officially subjected during
the course of the last two years.
Some New Limits to De-Stalinization. In 1963, at the
March meeting of party and government officials with
prominent leaders in literature and the arts, Khrushchev
warned of literary tendencies to "concentrate all attention on the instances of illegality, arbitrariness and abuse
of power" during the "era of the cult." He emphasized
that the party had given an adequate account of these
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days to the people already and that these years of Stalinist rule "were not a period of stagnation in the development of Soviet society, as our enemies imagine." Socialism was built successfully and state and party withstood
the trials of war.
Elaborating on his famous report to the 20th Congress
( 1956), Khrushchev 16 stressed that the shortcomings that
were revealed were not those of the party or the state
but those inherent in Stalin's character. He now disclosed
that Lenin himself had warned the party to look for a
leader more "tolerant, more loyal, more courteous, and
more considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc." Despite aH this Stalin "was a Marxist and this cannot and
must not be denied. At Stalin's funeral many people, myself included, had tears in their eyes. These were sincere
tears. Although we did know of some of Stalin's personal shortcomings, we still believed him. " During the
last years of his life, Khrushchev emphasized, Stalin was
"a profoundly sick man who suffered from suspiciousness
and persecution mania." Even the doctors' plot and
other cases of fabricated subversion - some of which
Beria and Kaganovich instigated - would have been more
numerous and more severe "if everyone who worked beside Stalin at that time had agreed with him in everything." Why did the party not stop Stalin during the
years of the purges? Khrushchev now somewhat lamely
admits that while the party did know of the arrests they
did not know that "those arrested were innocent." The
party "believed Stalin and did not admit the thought
that repression could be applied against honest people
devoted to our cause."
That the process of de-Stalinization, on the other hand,
must not turn the party into a Western-style democratic
political structure Khrushchev 17 makes quite clear when
he asserts that "every Communist has the right to express his opinion, but when the Party makes a decision,
sets forth the general line, then all Party members stand
in single rank and start to do what the collective thought
and will of the Party has worked out . . . the Party
should rid itself of those people who hold their own mistaken opinion higher than the decisions of the Party."
No Coexistence in the Realm of Ideas. At the party
plenary session on ideological questions, July 3, 1963,
Khrushchev 18 redefined once again one of his favorite
themes, there can be no peaceful coexistence between
capitalism and communism in matters of ideology. Such
coexistence he contended "would give the enemy an opportunity to blacken everything most dear to us, to encourage slander, to facilitate corruption of the people's
consciousness, to destroy our self discipline, and in every
way reta,d our advance. We have fought and will continue . . . (to fight) . . . with all implacability . . .
not only against corrupt bourgeois ideology but against
its agents in our midst, as the agents of our class enemies."
One of this year's most vituperative assaults on the
West was delivered by Ilyichin,1 9 the party's ideologist.
The occasion was the June session of the party's central
committee. He rejected out of hand any notion that
modern capitalism had lost its "exploitive" or "inhuman"
Journal of, Volume Thirry-two , No . 2, 1965

character, that "welfare" capitalism or "free enterprise"
capitalism could improve the lives of the workers or that
capitalism and socialism could move into converging
streams of development, or that there could ever be a
"synthesis" or "hybridization" of the two systems. There
will be no "ideological erosion" of socialist society, he
insisted. We must go on the "offensive against bourgeois
ideology, unmask the misanthropic core of imperialism,
its bestial customs, to excise all the ulcers of the old order from the minds of the Soviet people, to raise active
and staunch fighters for communism. " Singled out as one
such ulcer was religion, "chief opponent of the scientific
world view in the U.S.S.R ., one of the most tenacious
survivals of the past from which considerable numbers
of the population have not freed themselves despite the
fact that the institutional roots of religion have long ago
been destroyed."
Attacks on Abstract Art and "Maverick Wri1ers ." Few
remarks of Khrushchev ' 0 received wider international notoriety than his famous quip at abstract art. Visiting an
anniversary exhibition of works created by Moscow artists, he reacted most indignantly to a group of abstract
paintings by labeling them "'pictures' that make you
wonder whether they were painted by the hand of man
or daubed by a donkey's tail."
The next day, Pravda"' editorialized that the artists
had forgotten Party spirit and communist moral content
"under the pretext of allegedly daring artistic searches of
allegedly daring innovation," that they strayed and betrayed "the glorious traditions of our realistic art," and
that these "pseudo innovators, turning away from the
life, struggle and labor of their people, thoughtlessly
chase after Western 'fashion' and engage in miserable
aping of the depraved formalistic art of the bourgeois
world, which is in its very nature profoundly alien to our
world view, our esthetic ideals, our concepts of excellence, of beauty."
llyichev 22 delivered the party's policy statement on literature and art three months later, at Sverdlov Hall, at
a conference of party leaders, artists, writers, film directors and musicians. His attack centered on "formalism,"
on attempts of writers and artists to ignore the ideological
mission of their work. The thesis he developed was unmistakable. As artists "we have complete freedom to
struggle for communism. We do not have and cannot
have freedom to struggle against communism." These
pronouncements culminated months of meetings throughout the Soviet Union in which were assailed a group of
younger writers -Russia's "angry young men" for their
failure to contribute to realistic socialist art, for having
created weak art, and for having vacillated and deviated
from the main line of communist art.
For some months, following the 22nd Congress, Yevtuchenko was able to publicly recite his anti-Stalinist
poetry, and the editors of Novy Mir, the literary magazine, felt sufficiently safe to publish Solzhenitsyn's "One
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" as well as Ehrenburg's memoirs "People, Years, Life." It seemed as if
Soviet intellectuals at last were being given the opportunity to create and share their works in a climate of en133

couragement, freed from party censure or cnt1c1sms.
Yevtuchenko, especially, seemed to reflect faithfully the
bitterly anti-Stalinist yet deeply communistic mood of a
generation that was in search of a new sense of integrity
and courage.
"I realize
that something has been cut out root and branch,
something new and great is plain to see.
1 notice:
people have become more outspoken,
they're harsher now toward baseness
and dissembling,
people have become more ironic,
and more confident,
both kindlier and more considerate
than they used to be.
1 don't agree to calling it
a 'thaw'.
It real'ly is a spring
though a very hard spring.
And those grown used to being hypocrites
and cowards
Are with good reason in dismay nowadays.
This city remembers the 'Black Marias',
remembers the searches,
the questionings
and the arrests.
But just you lend an ear to conversations of today:
There's the sound of April in the talk!
A wind
blustering in the young leaves,
is blowing balky trash over the sidewalks.
The city has a feeling of responsibility
for the future .
Not without reason does the city keep in mind the past.
This city
is sure of itself.
It will not let grim ghosts
come to life again.
The memorable year of '17 will be immortal here.
Never will it know again
the year of '37.
•

*
Shaking their heads, they say to me:
'We wish you had a kinder disposition ,
You're such an angry man!'
I did have once.
Not for long.
Life changed me.
It kicked me in the teeth.
I had been Jiving like a foolish pup.
When struck
I'd turn the other cheek.
So that I might angrier be,
I chopped off
My tail of complacency,
myself,
with one blow!
And I'm going to tell you something now about anger.
Every so often they whisper to me before a meeting starts:
' Drop it!
You're young. Better stick to your writing,
and for the time being don't be quick to pick a fight .'
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But I don't give an inch:
To be angry at untruth that's being kind.
I'm a Communist by my very nature.
Communism bids me
be angrier and angrier
at what stands in its way,
and I am not led astray by advice.
My onetime timidity is gone,
andlife is interesting when you're angry."

2"

Yevtuchenko's difficulties with the party came to a climax when the French magazine "L'Express" published
his "Autobiography of a Precocious Man." At the plenary session of the Board of U.S.S.R. Writers' Union," '
speakers claimed that the work "evoked legitimate indignation among Soviet literary people . . . it abounds in
untrue assertions and judgments." Its style was found
wanting, its philosophy, divorced from the party, seemed
''to defend some sort of abstract truth." The most serious
charge touched upon his loyalty. "Why does Ye. Yevtuchenko give our ideological opponents an opportunity
to conduct speculative discussion about the possibility
of an 'opposition' of some kind appearing in our country by hinting in the pages of a foreign magazine that
some sort of special trend of those who share his view
is forming?"
Before the session concluded Yevtuchenko ( along
with such other errant writers as Aksenov and Voznesensky) was forced to recant. The official report of the meeting of the writers' board 2 " indicates something of the
climate of the proceedings. "In the first part of his speech
Ye. Yevtuchenko attempted to dispute the sharp criticisms directed at him. He also cited tendenciously chosen
quotations from his Autobiography, which do not give
an objective representation of it. But under the influence
of the exacting, principled atmosphere of the plenary
session, Ye. Yevtuchenko was nevertheless obliged to
admit that he was mistaken." The Autobiography, Yevtuchenko acknowledged, "contained many imprecise
formulations and unnecessary details, much immodesty."
Speaker after speaker at subsequent meetings of the
Young Communist League and party proceeded to condemn the "liberal" intellectuals for their ideological failures and confusions. In May, 1963 Izvestia 2 0 published
the following note on the young, "errant writers": "V.
Aksenov is going to Siberia, to a construction project,
and A. Voznesensky is spending a considerable part of
his time at enterprises in Vladimir province. It is to be
supposed that Ye. Yevtuchenko will also draw conclusions from his bitter mistakes . . . "
Ehrenburg, the "old" angry man has come under fire
for being favorable to "cubism," "modernism," and "surrealism." 27 But what angered Soviet leadership even
more, was his claim to "have had to live with clenched
teeth, that is be silent" during the era of the cult. His
critics took this to mean that he accused the party for
having long known of Stalin's crimes but re.fusing to do
anything about them while the leader was still living.
This, of course, could not be reconciled with the official
The Minnesota Academy of Science

line that insists that as soon as the party knew of Stalin's
arbitrary actions , they were exposed for all to see. Nobody, not even comrade Ehrenburg, had the right to
know about the cult of personality until its official acknowledgment at the time of the 20th Congress. Ehrenburg's memoirs implied a personal wisdom superior to
that of the party.
Again it was left to Ilyichev 28 to set the record
·'straight." He charged Ehrenburg with intellectual duplicity and conceit. Had Ehrenburg not eulogized Stalin
( in 19 51 ) as the one who "loved people, knew their
weaknesses and strength, understood the tears of the
mother who had lost her son in the war, understood the
labor of the miner and the stonemason . . . knew the
thoughts and feelings of hundreds of millions of people,
expressed their hopes, their will to happiness, their thirst
for peace." Ilyichev who also served Stalin, was quick to
add, "If I quote from your words, it is not in order to
single you out from among the many and blame you for
the words quoted. We all spoke and wrote this at the
time. And you, it turns out, did not believe but wrote!"
More Power to the Party. At the party central committee on November 19, 1962, Khrushchev 2 n delivered a
major policy speech in which he advocated a far more
active role for the party in the guidance and management of industrial and production enterprises . This was
necessary "in order to improve the methods of economic
management upon whose solution an acceleration in the
rate of our economic development depends." The reason
for poor organization in economic planning and in coordinating "research" with "design" in producing such
items as turbines, tractors, radios, and television was held
to be the failure of the Soviet economy to make sufficient
strides towards industrial concentration and specialization. "Why . . . do we not utilize what is rational and
economically advantageous that the capitalists have?"
While in the U.S. "90 per cent of all . . . (automobile)
. . . production are concentrated in three leading concerns" . . . and "in Italy one firm provides the whole
country with standard office furniture . . . the economic
councils of the Russian federation alone produce 156
types of chairs, 116 types of dinner tables, 222 types of
wardrobes and even 217 types of beds!"
By way of administrative reorganization, Khrushchev
proposed a plan under which the existing state planning
committees would be left with long-range planning responsibilities only, while the annual plan and its actual
managerial supervision would be entrusted to a newly
established Union Council of National Economy.
The major burden of his proposal, however, dealt with
another reform, with methods of raising labor productivity and overall efficiency in production. This could be
best accomplished, Khrushchev argued by applying the
Leninist principles of party-directed mass participation.
In place of the Leninist peasants' and workers' control
commissions fighting against "bureaucrats," "red-tape artists," "parasites" and "wasters of public wealth," Khrushchev now suggests something very similar: party-state
control committees to assure the fulfillment of plans and
production norms. "Comrades!" he explained, "As the
Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 2, 1965

Party Program emphasizes, the Communist Party's role
and significance in our state system rises further in the
period of full-scale construction of communism. This is
why the Party, as the most authoritative public organization in socialist society, should head the work of control,
should become its organizing and guiding force."
On November 23, 1962, 30 the plenary session of the
C.P.S.U. formally enacted a resolution to carry out the
reorganization proposals. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers implemented these resolutions a week later by authorizing the presidium to draft the necessary model statutes.
Assuring the Unity of the World Communist Party
System. Possibly no other single event or policy during
the last two years has assumed the significance for the
entire world, communist and non-communist, as the
open clash between Peking and Moscow. China's present
ideological quarrel with Khrushchev can probably be
traced back to the 20th Congress at which Stalin was
denounced, the peaceful coexistence theme given conspicuous attention, and the multiple roads to socialism
thesis first developed. Tensions were further aggravated
when Peking supported little Albania while Moscow excoriated it, when Peking called Tito a deviationist while
Moscow extended overtures of rapprochement to him.
and when Peking called for uncompromising hostility to
the West while Moscow sought some form of accommodation.
When Khrushchev consented to withdraw the missiles
from Cuba, China accused the Moscow leadership of
treasonable or "adventurist" moves in the direction of
appeasement and surrender to American imperia,lism.
While Pravda's 31 version of the Cuban decision may
not have adequately reflected either the facts of the confrontation or the motives of the United States, its line
could have done little to assuage the feelings of Mao Tsetung or Liu Shao-chin .
"For the first time during the past troubled days. people are breathing easily. They have learned with great
joy that conditions have been created for the elimination
of the menacing hotbed that threatened to flame into an
annihilating war. It was with deep satisfaction and gratitude that humanity greeted the wise and farsighted measures of the Soviet government, which took the initiative
in eliminating the crisis caused by the aggressive actions
of the U.S. circles in the Caribbean area."
The clearest and most up-to-date exposition of Peking's ideological contentions are found in the lengthy letter of June 14 3 2 in which the Chinese Communist Party's
Central Committee addresses itself to their Soviet comrades on issues of controversy between them. Some of the
issues had already been covered in a series of formal exchanges of views beginning in February, 1963.
Acrimonious in tenor and argumentative in substance,
the letter attempts to offer a complete repudiation of
Khrushchev's ideological leadership on the basis of a Maoist interpretation of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles. Without ever referring to Khrushchev by name, but
deluding no one with the semantic disguise of "certain
persons," he and his party were accused of having
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adopted policies "betraying the interests of the entire
international proletariat and all the peoples of the world,"
showing "cowardice in the face of the imperialists,"
"helping to restore capitalism" in the Soviet Union.
Referring to the status of the underdeveloped nations
in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Peking insisted that
Moscow was "taking a passive or scornful or negative
attitude toward the struggles of the oppressed nations
for liberation." These "certain persons . . . are in fact
protecting the interests of monopoly capital, betraying
those of the proletariat and degenerating into Social
Democrats."
As to "peaceful competition," Peking adjudges it
"sheer illusion" to "hold that it is possible to bring about
a world without weapons, without armed forces and
without war." Nor can there ever be "general and complete disarmament" while the system of imperialism and
of the exp'loitation of man by man still exists. Neither can
the transition from capitalism to socialism be anything
but violent. "The proletarian party must never base its
thinking, its policies for revolution and its entire work
on the assumption that the imperialists and reactionaries
will accept peaceful transformation."
At first the Soviets refused to publish Peking's "missile" on the ground that a formal reply would "lead to a
further aggravation of the polemics." Then, on July 14,
Pravda finally issued both the complete text of the Chinese letter as well as the official answer of 21,000 words
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, addressed to "party organizations and
all communists of the Soviet Union."
The tone of the rejoinder was restrained but manifestly resentful. To the charge of Soviet neglect of the
less fortunate members of the proletariat in the emerging
nations, Moscow responded with a few pointed reminders. Had the Chinese forgotten the aid and assistance given them by the Soviet Union in the realm of
science, technology, industry and economic development?
or the support given the liberation movements in Vietnam? Egypt? Iraq? Algeria? Yemen? "the Cubans and
other peoples?"
Beyond the question of aid - and much more central
to the dispute - Khrushchev's Central Committee wished
to leave no doubt of its basic disagreement with the
Maoist interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist thesis concerning the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat and
the revolutionary struggle at the present stage of historical development.
Moscow accused Peking of "groundless and slanderous attacks" on the decisions of the 20th, 21st and 22nd
party congresses which attemtped to overcome the differences between the "fraternal parties" and to strengthen the unity of the communist movement; of "taking it
upon themselves" to defend the Stalinist cult of personality and with it the "forms and methods of leadership
that was flourishing in that period" - an era of "fear,
suspicion, and uncertainty that poisoned the life of the
people . . ."; of falsely insisting that Leninism called
for a dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union
whereas workers, peasants and intellectuals were living
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in a relationship of friendly rather than exploiting classes;
of "failure of faith" in the ability of "socialist achievement" to inspire "the hearts and minds" of the workers
throughout the world and in socialism's victory over capitalism by economic competition; of failing to understand
that unless capitalists provoke force the period of transition to socialism need not be characterized by violence;
of encouraging "anti-party groups" and "renegades" and
driving a wedge between communist parties in the U.S.,
Belgium, Italy, Brazil, Australia and India; and of discrediting Yugoslav-Soviet efforts at rapprochement and
friendship.
Moscow reserved its most severe condemnation for
what it called Peking's "willingness to play with the destiny of millions of people" - an irresponsible attitude on
the nature of modern war.
"It is permissible to ask the Chinese comrades if they
realize what sort of 'ruins' a world nuclear-rocket war
would leave behind ... Apparently ... ( those who) ...
refer to the thermonuclear weapon as a 'paper tiger' are
not fully aware of the destructive force of this weapon
. . . We soberly consider this. We ourselves produce the
thermonuclear weapon and have manufactured it in sufficient quantity. We know its destructive force full well.
And if imperialism starts a war against us, we shall not
hesitate to use this formidable weapon against the aggressor. But if we are not attacked, we shall not be the
first to use this weapon.
The working classes of the world struggling against
capitalism have given no one the right to achieve socialism through the unleashing of a world holocaust. "If
both the exploiter and the exploited are buried under the
ruins of the old world, who will build the 'bright future'?"
Based on the "peaceful coexistence" line of the 22nd
Congress, the C.P.S.U. rejects the "fatal-inevitability"-ofwar thesis between states with differing social systems;
the prevention of nuclear war is "quite a real and feasible
task."
Also, far from being apologetic about the withdrawal
of missiles from Cuba, which the Chinese labeled imperialist appeasement, Moscow asserts that the aggressive
forces of imperialism were effectively restrained and the
"heroic struggle" of the Cuban people safeguarded. "This
was a major victory of the policy of reason." The U.S.
has kept its word and not invaded the island; "do . . .
( the Chinese) . . . really think that all bourgeois governments lack all reason in everything they do?"
IV. Evaluation and Summary

While far from being precise and reliable in detail, the
picture that does emerge from a study of the Program
of the 22nd Congress and its official interpretations is
certainly not devoid of significant clues about the nature
of the changes that are presently at work in Moscow and
in the communist world as a whole.
Although the Soviet Union was supposedly run by a
collegium, Khrushchev as the chairman of the party's presidium seemed to be very much more equal than his colleagues. He appeared to establish the line - in art, foreign policy, disarmament, administration - and personThe Minnesota Academy of Science

ally inspire it with his moods of exuberance, arrogance,
cajolery or sobriety. Whether in Moscow or on the road,
in speeches, press conferences, interviews, and social
settings, he elucidated the party program, by quote and
commentary to give a particular policy its ideological
support and authority.
The task of transmitting the party Program's goals
and commands to factory, village, district and kolkhose,
and to every level of Soviet organization, was undeniably
that of the party. In this, Khrushchev's party clearly assured its ascendancy over the bureaucracy, the military
and the secret police, none of whom contended any
longer for the signficant share of public power that was
theirs during the last days of Stalin's rule. Territorial
party organizations, whose cadres formed the backbone
of Khrushchev's power, were entrusted with the supervision and speed-up of needed industrial and agricultural
production. These younger and better educated party
leaders, eager for managerial power and upward mobility, may well have been a major force behind the newly
enacted party-state production law.
Reflected also in the Program and at the party sessions held since its adoption, was the continuing struggle
against the cult of personality. To be sure this process of
de-Stalinization was much less violent in character than
the shrill and vitriolic attacks levelled at the anti-party
group by speaker after speaker at the 22nd Congress. At
that occasion, among the many charges flung at them,
Malenkov was denounced for having once aided Yezhov
( a fonner head of the secret police) to mete out summary justice in Armenia; Kaganavich for blackmailing
and framing loyal party comrades; and Molotov for being an "incorrigible dogmatist" and for having opposed
the virgin-land program. In proceedings strangely reminiscent of an earlier era, all of them were collectively
accused of having conspired to seize power and for
wishing to reestablish the cult of personality. Fortunately
for them, their punishment was pointedly mild and
thoroughly "un-Stalin" like.
But then again, while de-Stalinization served Khrushchev well in solidifying his power and increasing his
popularity, it, too, as so many other doctrines and theses
of Soviet idealogy, became subject to revision and reinterpretation when time and circumstances demanded it.
As noted earlier, Khrushchev for very obvious reasons
had no hesitancy in applying the brakes to the process
of de-Stalinization when, in his judgment, it developed
too sweeping a momentum and became too prone to
strike out indiscriminately at all of Stalin's acts and associates. Seven years ago he proved this ruthlessly in the
streets of Budapest; later less bloodily, he guarded the
line in art and literature.
Next to avoiding the repressive climate of the Stalinist
era, few measures have earned Khrushchev more acclaim
among the masses of the Soviet people, than his repeated
emphasis on improved living standards. Yet the Program's most ambitious promise, that it would be possible
within this generation to create the material basis for an
economy of such abundance as to insure the actual transition to communism, contained within it, also, the party's
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most serious challenge. As production targets were not
met the scene was set for continued attacks on bureaucratic bungling, the cupidity of officialdom, economic
crimes of speculation ( with anti-semitic overtones);
emphasis was hopefully placed on the need to speed
administrative reorganization, centralizing economic planning while simultaneously decentralizing economic initiative, and on the necessity of improving work on the
virgin lands. When all this failed to produce results,
Khrushchev was ousted. The extent of elasticity within
Soviet ideology is apparently considerable. What is involved, for example, is no less than a basic reexamination
of the entire pattern of collectivized agriculture where
low incentives, poor peasant morale and lack of capital
equipment has long held back critically needed increases
in the production of food and fiber.
Khrushchev's "softer line" notwithstanding, there was
nothing in his Program to indicate an immanent turn to
any Western-style liberalism. On the contrary, there
was evidence of genuine fear that Soviet youth, especially the country's younger artists and intellectuals, might
be overly eager to desert the unifying and collectivizing
nurture of party ideology. Special party conferences
critically assailed the lack of enthusiasm that young
people displayed for "socialist realism" in art and literature, their desire to be a-political, to find autonomous
areas of self-expression, to resist party restraint and authority and to prefer the life of urban leisure to that of
communist service on the newly opened Eastern lands.
There is nothing particularly "liberal" in the widely
heralded de-emphasis upon the Soviet state apparatus as
a mechanism of control and supervision. A Rousseauean
type of mass participation in the affairs of public life,
with its rigid majoritarian intolerance of diversity and
uniqueness, comrade courts ( these are neighborhood
courts below the level of the people's courts; their procedure is much more informal and they do not· constitute
a court of record in our sense of the word) and "neighborly" concerns for all affording censure for the slightest
infraction of social expectation and conformity - such
developments can hardly be viewed as cradling individual
liberty. What it does mean is that the regime has declared its confidence that Soviet society has been sufficiently molded by the all-pervasive ideology so that the
party can take the risk of transferring to other public
organizations certain policing and controlling functions.
One apparatus of repression - direct, visible and bureaucratic - is replaced with another: more subtle, perhaps
even more effective, at best a benevolent totalitarianism
- but a totalitarianism nonetheless.
It is around the concept of "peaceful coexistence" that
the Program affords the Soviets some considerable ideological elasticity with important consequences for the
conduct of its international and interparty relations. As
has been noted, the concept does not exactly mean what
it says. There is nothing in it, from the Soviet point of
view, to constitute a blanket disavowal of war, or a
negation of military intervention and wars of assistance
on behalf of nations engaged in "anti-colonial" or "antiimperialist" struggles of liberation. Yet Khrushchev's
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speeches, communist-party declarations and the party
Program - despite their semantic vagueness and propagandistic quality- do permit at least these generaljzations
concerning Soviet peace claims: that they are seriously
impressed with the enormously destructive character of
thermonuclear and missile weaponry; that they will not
start a nuclear war but will respond with such weapons
if attacked; that they are willing to negotiate all outstanding differences with the West; and that their major struggles against capitalism will take place in the realm of
ideological warfare and economic competition.
It was probably unavoidable that the concept of
"peaceful competition," in connection with the events
since the 20th Congress, was bound to aggravate the
polycentrist tendencies that are now shaking the very
foundations of the one-time monolithic solidarity of the
communist world movement. To be sure, Mao Tse-tung's
letter of June 14 did not start the fissure in the ideological wall surrounding the Marxist-Leninist tabernacle. He
had had his difficulties with Stalin while Khrushchev was
still an unknown commissar in the Ukraine but this in no
way minimizes the enormity of the conflict. At stake is
the nature of the communist leadership for the large
masses of submerged people in the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America to whom both
Moscow and Peking wish to export clearly competing
doctrines of revolution. These are the people who can
more easily understand and share Peking's anger at Moscow's alleged reluctance to share its material wealth and
scientific knowledge with less prosperous comrades. Accustomed to seeing the problems of political life in simple
and sharply defined alternatives, they are inclined to exhibit impatience and disdain for the more cautious and
conservative efforts at accommodation ad compromise .
In this struggle among the "fraternal" parties, Moscow
is neither without power nor without protagonists. Its
industrial and military base is incomparably more impressive than that of China. For the present, domestic
Stalinists have been successfuJly contained and Khrushchev and his policies can count on solid support from
the communist parties of the West, as well as from a substantial majority of the cadres of Africa and Latin
America.
And yet, despite such support, communist parties are
bitterly dividing nearly everywhere, especially in Mexico,
Brazil and Italy. Cuba's Castro opportunistically plays off
Moscow against Peking to obtain increased quantities of
machinery and military hardware. Eastern European
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satellites become more restless as they seek greater economic independence and the more favorable trade with
the Western bloc.
The price that Moscow must pay in order to hold together the remnants of the once vaunted communist
monolith cannot be cheap.
It is by no means certain whether the ideological and
political schisms of the communist bloc will work to
the benefit of the West. What is offered is a breather,
an opportunity for all to see once again that there is no
superhuman strength in the communist community or in
their ideology; their party discipline is not unyielding.
The forces of nationalism or race may yet be stronger
than either Leninism or Khrushchevism.
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